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A FOOTNOTE TO PHILOSOPHY AT 
MID-CENTURY * 
HE twentieth century has run slightly Inore than half 
its course. At mid-century, as at century's end, it is 
natural to pause for a backward and a forwasd glance. For 
we often best understand our present situation, with its im- 
pending tasks and futu1.e prospects, by looking back over the 
road by which we reached the place where we now stand. 
I have called this talk a footnote not only because it is a 
reflective aside, a comment made on the main text in pass- 
ing, but also because it disregards the full range of the 
larger problem in favor of concentrating on a single interest- 
ing feature of the history of philosophy in the last fifty years. 
I would not be understood to suggest that this feature is 
itself of minor significance. We shall see that it tempts us 
to project the rather bold hypothesis that the first quarter of 
this century witnessed the culmination of the long effort 
of modern philosophy to achieve a stable understanding 
of scientific knowledge. But the price of concentration is 
omission, and very little is said about ideas, such, for ex- 
ample, as Whitehead's, which may be more prophetic of the 
philosophical future than those about which I have more to 
say. 
In  philosophy the past fifty years may stand alone in one 
respect. Perhaps there has never been a like intelval of time 
in which so many men, so learned in many things, so sophis- 
ticated intellectually, so alert to alternatives, so wary of 
prejudice and precipitate judgment, so diligent and skillful 
in argument, have engaged in so many kinds of philosophi- 
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cal inquiry. In numbers involved, in variety of interests, in 
range of accurate information, the philosophical activity 
of our century commands respect. Scholars have fruitfully 
cultivated all the traditional fields of philosophy: logic, 
epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, the history of 
philosophy. There have also been specialists in a host of 
philosophies-of, such as the philosophy of history, of reli- 
gion, of education, of science, of language. 
Not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, the general 
level of technical performance has been high. To record the 
names of all able philosophers of Europe, Britain, and the 
Americas who have earned a sound reputation among their 
colleagues would make a very long list. The true touchstone 
of an epoch, however, is not so much the general level of 
performance as the peaks of attainment. To borrow a figure 
of which my colleague, Mr. Tsanoff, is fond-mountain 
ranges, however high, have eminences which stand out 
above the rest. They are what catch the eye and give form 
and identity to the entire range. The weather, if not the 
climate, of opinion makes up amidst these high peaks. From 
them the winds of doctrine blow that sweep foothill and 
plain below. Our century has great peaks as well as high 
plateaus. A small number of philosophical minds of infec- 
tious originality have influenced the thinking of all their 
contemporaries. In this respect also it has been a significant 
time. 
Let us make a list of the most prominent figures. I t  will 
include William James, Henri Bergson, Benedetto Croce, 
John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead.' 
These, incidentally, are names familiar to everybody. Al- 
most any educated person could have named them as read- 
ily as a professional in philosophy. Shall we add others to 
the list? Perhaps, Edmund Husserl, whose phenomenological 
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movement was probably the most original and ~owerful in 
German philosophy of this century? Ought we to include 
Bernard Bosanquet, a skilIful advocate of idealism during 
the early years of the century? 
The exact list does not matter, But the more we think 
about it, the more conspicuously does a certain peculiar 
feature stand out. Consider: James, born in 1842, was fifty- 
eight in 1900. If he belongs to this century, it is only because 
he did much of his philosophical writing in the decade 
before his death in 1910. Bergson and Dewey were already 
in early middle age at the turn of the century, both having 
been born in 1859, the year in which Darwin published 
The Origin of Species. Whitehead was only two years 
younger. Croce had reached his middle thirties by 1900, 
and the youngest, Russell, was already twenty-eight. Every 
preeminent philosopher of the twentieth century had com- 
pleted his formal education before the end of the nine- 
teenth. Evely one of them had fully established his philo- 
sophical importance by 1929 at the latest. No philosopher 
of comparable magnitude has appeared in the last twenty- 
five years, though original work of a high order has not 
been lacking in many special fields. 
While there is no reason to expect men of genius to 
appear in even-paced succession, like soldiers in a file, the 
absence of figures of first rank makes the second quarter- 
century seem rather unproductive as compared with the 
fertiIe first quarter. This may, of course, be an iI1usion re- 
sulting from a trick of historical perspective. The mountain 
peak ordinarily comes into view and exhibits its rugged 
identity only at a distance. We may not appreciate the im- 
portance of some current philosopher simply because we 
stand too close to him. Moreover, as we grow older we 
tend to admire past originality more than present inno- 
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vation. Such doubts as these serve as useful warnings against 
dogmatism; yet they do not suffice to show that the dis- 
proportion between the two quarters of our century is 
wholly illusory. When Dewey's Experience and Nature ap- 
peared in 1925 (second edition 1929), nobody had any doubt 
that here was a definitive statement of a major philosophical 
alternative. The same may be said even more emphatically 
of P~ocess and Reality (1929), which immediately secured 
for Whitehead, already admired and famous, a permanent 
place among the great philosophers, perhaps of all time. 
Able and even distinguished work has been done in more 
recent years, but nothing with such breadth. and such 
penetration that it seems to cast light into the darkest 
corners of our philosophical ignorance. 
One has the feeling that a good many people to-day would 
regard this turn of events with approval. They would wel- 
come it as evidence of growing intellectual maturity. I t  
would suggest to them that the scientific revolution had at 
last completed itself in the way expected by Auguste Comte, 
so that old-style philosophy is suffering, as it were, from 
technological unemployment. Comte held, you will recalI, 
that human thinking progresses through three stages: the 
theological, the metaphysical, the scientific. A vigorous 
movement of the last two or three decades has done all in 
its power to empty philosophy of what it considers 'ineta- 
physical" questions and restrict it to the analysis of lan- 
guage, the instrument of expression and communication. But 
one does not need to go so far in order to appreciate the 
effect that the increased range and precision of scientific 
knowledge has had on philosophical ambition. Throughout 
this century, philosophy has tended to grow more special- 
ized and to rely upon increasingly technical methods. Its 
solutions have not come wholesale, if they ever did, but 
The Rice Institute Pamphlet 
have had to be paid for bit by bit in hard, small coin. In- 
tensive preoccupation with minute questions reflects an 
aversion to the apparently ineffectual methods of ordinary 
disputation, but it also affirms the unmanageable range of 
modern knowledge, One man can hardly survey, let alone 
master, the facts and ideas which are relevant to any broad 
philosophical construction, The sciences have held before 
our eyes a more and more significant model of warranted 
knowledge; they confront us with a high standard of critical 
caution and intellectual integrity, which in some ways is 
even more impressive than the vast amount of information 
which they provide. Philosophers have had good reason to 
grow more daden t  and to codine attention to limited prob- 
lems which seem capable of definite solution. Thus does 
minute analysis tend to replace large construction. 
We must also acknowledge that a period which saw the 
depression, the incredibly deliberate attempt of the Nazis 
in Germany to destroy the moral sinews of European civili- 
zation, the Second World War, the subsequent cold war, 
and now the Korean war-such a period is not exactly 
conducive to reflective thinking. We have suffered less than 
many others; but recurrent crises have compelled us re- 
peatedly to mobilize most of our mental as well as our 
material resources. Even if the individual philosopher suc- 
ceeds in preserving his detachment in the midst of excite- 
ments, perpetual anxiety effectually deprives him of a re- 
sponsive general audience. 
Whatever vaIue we may attach to these various con- 
siderations, they do not, I think, tell the wliole story. They 
are one and all peripheral to the central philosophical effort. 
This has its own compelling rhythm, and the first quarter of 
the twentieth century seems to mark one of its culminating 
moments. The long, persistent attack upon some of the 
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most pressing problems of modern philosophy reached con- 
clusions that are, at least tenlporarily, satisfactory, so satis- 
factory that further effort has not produced further insights 
of comparable generality with respect to the same problems. 
I t  is not well to be dogmatic about matters of this kind, 
but what seems to me to have happened is this. Modern 
science reached the full vigor of its maturity in this cen- 
tury, and modern philosophy, which always has been the 
philosophy of the new science and the scientific revolution, 
matured with it. The advance of science made its criteria, 
methods, and objectives increasingly plain, so that a philo- 
sophical understanding of science became possible without 
borrowing insights from other modes of belief and other 
forms of intellectual activity. The first quarter-century 
brought this understanding to a point that has left little 
for the second quarter to do but consolidate the gains. 
Many persons would take issue with this interpretation. 
We do not claim for it  such certainty as the evaluation of 
a complex historical epoch clearly cannot possess. Impres- 
sive considerations, nevertheless, make the idea attractive. 
While this is not an appropriate occasion to fill in the tech- 
nical details, further explanation is in order. 
The first step is to widen the historical perspective, so 
that we no longer treat the years of our century as if they 
stood miraculously dissociated from the past. This does not 
require us to jump rashly from the frying pan of doubtf~zl 
interpretations of matters of common knowIedge into the 
roaring fires of historical speculation. What is needed is 
a stabilizing context. Modern philosophy, we remarked 
above, is preeminently the philosophy of the scientific revo- 
lution. We must now attempt to obtain an understanding 
of what that means; otherwise, there is little prospect of 
getting our century into a clear light, since science unques- 
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tionably has stood at  the very center of its philosophic 
interest. Most of its important achievements have been as- 
sociated with innovations in pure logic and in epistemology, 
the branch of philosophy which critically inquires into the 
sources and structures of valid knowledge, particularly as 
embodied in the sciences. In  this respect our period is the 
legitimate heir of its past. Hence, to glance briefly at  the 
scientific revolution itself, the main source of the philo- 
sophic tensions of the whole modern age, wilI more than 
repay the time it takes. 
An effort of imagination is necessary. So accustomed 
are we to the ideas and surroundings which have resulted 
from scientsc investigation, that we are likely to accept 
our world as simple, obvious, natural, and inevitable. If 
anybody should ask us point-blank about it, perhaps we 
would hedge a little and concede some of the difficulties 
which this development had to overcome. Our real opinion, 
nevertheless, is likely to show itself in an air of condescen- 
sion toward men of former centuries, as if we could not 
comprehend how anybody could have been so dull and 
resistant to the truth as to think otherwise than we now 
do. Although the revolution in opinions which science has 
brought about has come as slowly and painfully as the 
accompanying social changes, it now takes effort to appre- 
ciate the magnitude of the changes that have taken place 
in men's ideas. 
In  this connection, let me read, with irrelevant omissions, 
a vivid passage from a recent book on The Origins of 
Modern Science by Herbert Butterfield, a Cambridge his- 
torian. 
. . . when we of the year 1949 take our perspective of the 
scientific revolution-we are in a position to see its implica- 
tions at the present day much more clearly than the men who 
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flourished fifty or even twenty years before us. And . . . it is 
not we who are under an optical illusion-reading the present 
back into the past-for the things that have been revealed in 
the 1940s merely bring out more vividly the vast importance 
of the turn which the world took three hundred years ago, 
in the days of the scientific revolution. We can see why our 
predecessors were less conscious of the significance of the 
seventeenth century-why they talked so much more of the 
Renaissance or the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, for 
example . . . Our Graeco-Roman roots and our Christian 
heritage were so profound-so central to all our thinking-that 
it has required centuries of pulls and pressures, and almost a 
conflict of civilizations in our very midst, to make i t  clear that 
the center had shifted. . . . The veiy strength of our convic- 
tion that ours was a Graeco-Roman civilization-the very 
way in which we allowed the art-historians and the phi- 
lologists to make us think that this thing which we call "the 
modern world" was the product of the Renaissance-the in- 
elasticity of our historical concepts, in fact-helped to conceal 
the radical nature of the changes that had taken place and 
the colossal possibilities that lay in the seeds sown by the 
seventeenth century. The seventeenth century, indeed, did 
not merely bring a new factor into history, & the way we 
often assume-one that must just be added, so to speak, to 
the other permanent factors. The new factor immediately 
began to elbow at the other ones, pushing them out of their 
places-and, indeed, began immediately to seek control of the 
rest, as the apostles of the new movement had declared their 
intention of doing from the very start. The result was the 
emergence of a kind of Western civiIization which when 
transmitted to Japan operates on tradition there as it operates 
on tradition here-dissolving it and having eyes for nothing 
save a future of brave new worlds. I t  was a civilization that 
could cut itself away from the Graeco-Roman heritage in 
general, away from Christianity itself-only too confident in 
its power to exist independent of anything of the kind. We 
know now that what was emerging towards the end of the 
seventeenth century was a civilization exhilaratingly new 
perhaps, but strange as Nineveh and Babylon. That is why, 
since the rise of Christianity, there is no landmark in history 
that is worthy to be compared with this.2 
Before making use of this passage for my own purposes, 
let me pause to remark that Butterfield is writing as a his- 
- - 
torian whose business is to record and interpret historic 
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changes, not to approve or condemn them. Moreover, his 
views do not necessarily coincide with my own in every 
respect. 
The revolutionary men of the seventeenth century, those 
whom Butterfield caned the "apostles" of the movement, 
understood intuitively what was afoot. Both those whose 
fame is mainly scientific and those whose fame is mainly 
philosophic sensed that one type of mind was being de- 
stroyed by a new type which was coming into being to 
take its place, That is the meaning both of Francis Bacon's 
famous doctrine of the idols of the mind and of Descartes' 
method of systematic doubt. Both men perceived that new 
truth was needed and a new method to discover it. Both 
understood that nothing worth while could be done unless 
the preconceptions which cluttered the mind were first 
uprooted-the old, habitual ways of thinking about things, 
the rigid customs of conservative thought. As long as old 
ideas prevail, they thought, everything will be forced into 
the same old molds and nobody will learn anything new 
and true about nature. 
The revolutionary men of the seventeenth century were 
intuitively certain also that the new minds would make a 
new world. Bacon sought a new knowledge that could be 
put to use in the service of men" every-day needs; he was 
certain that genuine knowledge was power and would irn- 
prove the ordinary lot of mankind. Even the vastly more 
intellectual Descartes valued the new learning hardly less 
for its utility than for its truth. A new world was somehow 
coming into being, and these men were assisting enthusias- 
tically at its birth, although, I dare say, they had not the 
faintest suspicion that it would be as "strange as Nineveh 
and Babylon." They could hardly have failed to think of 
the new science, as most of us continue to do, in just the 
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way that Butterfield rejects. They must have considered 
science to be a new factor-albeit a dominant one-along- 
side the rest, and may have had an inadequate appreciation 
of the full extent to which a new way of investigating nature 
would transform all habits of thought and many types of 
behavior, as well as the material circumstances of men's 
lives. For all his assiduously cultivated doubt, Descartes 
expected to recover, and in the end thought he had recov- 
ered, many of the theological essentials of medieval thought. 
Although the apostles of the new learning had a correct 
premonition of the future, it does not follow that they could 
themselves give a correct account of the revolutionary new 
factor in civilization. I t  is one thing to be hopefully aware 
of the general direction of a vigorous trend in human affairs, 
and quite another thing to understand its nature correctly, 
its real mode of operation, and its full implications for the 
civilization which fosters it. In fact, exactly to the extent 
that the new science was really new and unprecedented, 
there was no genuine possibility of understanding it at all. 
I recall hearing Mr. Alex Keiller, who directed the restora- 
tion of the great prehistoric sanctuary at Avebury, in Eng- 
land, say that archeologists took comparatively little interest 
in Stonehenge, because it is unique. And something similar 
may be said of the scientific movement at the beginning, In 
so f a  as it was really new, it was unique, and its interpreters 
had nothing to go on. They simply did not possess the stock 
of ideas and the variety of experience which were required 
for elucidating its natt~re. 
That is not the worst of it. Science itself hardly existed as 
yet. I t  had to be hewn chip by chip out of the unknown 
by men who lived-methodologically speaking-from hand 
to mouth. They had to attack particular problems by any 
methods they could beg, borrow, or steal-or rather, invent. 
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Only gradually, as particular successes coalesced into mu- 
tualIy supporting patterns did this new factor in civiliza- 
tion take on an easily recognizable shape for philosophical 
analysis. Meanwhile, men did what they always do under 
such circumstances: having no alternative, they interpreted 
the new with the aid of whatever analogies lay at hand. 
Bacon and Locke generalized the inductive appeal to the 
facts of experience; Descartes generalized the new analytical 
techniques of a rapidly developing mathematics. Descartes 
saw science as what we would to-day call a deductive sys- 
tem: that is, a series of conclusive proofs derived ultimately 
from axiomatic principles. Locke considered knowledge to 
consist in the recognition of the relations holding among 
ideas which reflect experienced realities. The advancement 
of science itself was needed to show how far both views 
missed tile mark. 
If, as Butterfield observes, the twentieth century historian 
occupies a favored position with respect to the scientific 
revolution, the twentieth century philoso13her occupies a 
no less favored position with respect to the mature scien- 
tific establishment, which is the now familiar result of that 
revolution. Thus, if the men of the present century have 
found comparatively stable solutions to some of the per- 
sistent questions of modern philosophy, this happy achieve- 
ment need occasion no great surprise. Moreover, as long 
as science coiltinues to work steadily at its problems in the 
same general way without undergoing some unforeseeable 
mutation, there is no reason to expect these solutions to lose 
their relevance. They are obscure in some respects and are 
undoubtedly capable of further refinement. For example, 
much remains to be done in the detailed adjustment of 
philosophic ideas to the particular concepts and methods 
current in various branches of science. This has been per- 
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haps the most fruitful task of specialists in what we have 
begun in the last twenty-five years to call the philosophy 
of science, although the term reflects rather a new interest 
than new problems or basically new solutions. The study 
of logical or epistemological problems associated with speci- 
fic aspects of physical theory, for example, goes back at 
least as far as Mach in the last century and Poincari. in the 
early years of the present century, And the revolution in 
physics in the last fifty years supplied a new and compelling 
motive for intensifying the philosophic study of particular 
scientific concepts. I t  did so for the exceedingly good reason 
that it was itself associated with certain epistemological 
problems at the foundations of classical physics. The revolu- 
tion in physics brought modern science to a fuller maturity 
partly because it explicitly recognized these problems. Thus 
it was not inappropriate to devote a volume to Einstein in 
the Library of Living Philosophers, a distinguished series 
edited at Northwestern University by Paul Arthur SchiIpp. 
To say that in the first quarter of this century philosophers 
reached a substantial solution to one of the persistent prob- 
lenls of modern philosophy does not mean that they must 
henceforth cherish an eternal truth with dogmatic tenacity. 
To suggest, however, that they have reached a solution of 
any kind-tentative and conditioned by vagaries of current 
scientific practice though it may be-is likely to be greeted 
with suspicion, if not with downright disbelief. Thus it is 
important to explain the alleged solution. 
This is not easy to do, because the issues are frequently 
subtle. An account simple enough to be intelligible runs the 
risk of making things seem too easy. But let us recall what 
was said a moment ago about the effort of sympathetic 
imagination that is needed if we are to see through the eyes 
of our predecessors. Once we have accustomed ourselves to 
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seeing things in a certain way, particularly if we think there 
are obvious empirical grounds for doing so, we wonder how 
really intelligent men could have failed to get the point. And 
we still wonder with- one half of our minds, even when 
we know with the other half that the nineteenth century 
had to produce two or three achievements of the first rank 
ill mathematics, logic, and empirical science, before the 
best minds at the beginning of our century could have seen 
what they have taught the rest of 11s to take for granted by 
now. 
What we have been made to see with new eyes is, in a 
word, man's remarkable powers of free, intellectual inven- 
tion and his dependence on those powers for his ability to 
discover the independent order of nature. Without this 
creative, original activity by which the mind runs ahead of 
experience with ideas of structures more exact than any it 
finds, the inquisitive man would have no powei$ul methods 
for obtaining reliable knowledge of the objective, mutual 
relevance of events. Events run their course, stolidly in- 
different to the inventions of the intellect. Without the 
inventions, however, knowledge, particularly the delicately 
articulated systems of exact science, would not be possible. 
Anyone familiar with the history of ideas will recall that 
Kant said something like this aInlost one hundred and 
seventy-five years ago. Kant dressed his ideas up in quaint 
eighteenth century styles, which sometimes obscured the 
figure underneath. Men of our century had to re-think the 
problems, but they llad the equipment with which to do so. 
They approached the task both with new methods of ab- 
stract analysis and with a more concrete, historical concep- 
tion of man. 
Consider the latter. Under the impact of Darwinian ideas, 
jt became difficult to think of man except as an animal try- 
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ing, just like every other animal, to get along. He had serious 
handicaps, having lost the decent animal habit of growing 
clothes on his back. He had also lost the efficient simian 
ability to climb about in the comparative safety of treetops. 
He did not even have strong claws or good teeth, He had to 
live by his wits, or he would not live at all. Here lay his 
unique opportunity. When his ancestors swapped fur for 
brain, it was the best trade an animal ever made. He had 
come into possession of the bodily organ that would enable 
him to overrun the earth. Animal intelligence was raised to 
a higher power. For humans have an abnormally long span 
of anticipation, and this implies exceptional power to control 
the turn of events in their own interest. Every animal with 
distance receptors-eye, ear, nose-has time to take action to 
prevent calamity or to capture prey. He learns to anticipate 
the future in terms of the present witness of his senses. The 
fox flees the hounds' voice and confuses his trail; the lion 
circles into the wind to stalk his prey; the mother woodcoclc 
feigns a broken wing to draw an intruder away from the nest. 
Man, however, does not, like lion or wolf, merely follow 
where his game leads; he makes his prey stay put and be- 
comes the master of domesticated herds. He does not merely 
gather nuts, seeds, and fruits in season; planting at  the 
proper time, he grows them and becomes a tender of fields, 
He learns to control fire, to make tools and utensils, and 
finally to exchange goods in peaceful trade. Most important 
of all, however, he does not merely excel every other animal 
in reading natural signs, but he learns to control the produc- 
tion of signs themselves. He cultivates the ability to com- 
municate by means of articulate noises and comes into pos- 
session of language, which fixes and stabilizes the significant 
aspects of shifting experience and confers upon each genera- 
tion the long learning of the tribe. Finally, writing catches 
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the wind of the voice and immortalizes memory in stone. 
Such is man, the animal that has created science for his 
uses. In a way no other animal can follow, he has learned 
to read nature's signs more exactly with the aid of artful 
signs of his own contriving. He has learned also to experi- 
ment, tllat is, to control the conditions under which events 
unfold their natural consequences, so that he can both antici- 
pate and control the outcome of given situations. Viewed in 
an evolutionary perspective, science is concerned not with 
the past or the static, but with the future, to which alone 
action is relevant. Ideas are thus not conceived as copying 
anything, as if reality were obliging enough to sit for its 
portrait. Ideas are projections of the mind into the future 
of a fluent reality. They are phases of action, purposeful 
designs, farsighted forms of the animal cunning by which 
we manage to survive in a hard world. Ideas copy nothing 
fixed and abiding. They anticipate a doubtful future and 
provide a bridge by which action may more freely pass 
from one situation to another. They are said to be true when 
we have good warrant for trusting ourselves to their guid- 
ance. 
Everyone will have recognized the foregoing remarks as 
an impressionistic portrait of the kind of view which John 
Dewey has advocated throughout this century with impres- 
sive skill and enthusiasm. I t  does not much matter if in some 
respects the likeness is not exact. The important thing for 
our purpose is the insistence that ideas do not copy past 
experience, as the earlier empiricists imagined, but are in- 
vented devices, instruments of action, which the organism 
has forged in the effort to thrive. Ideas have a history, a 
time when they first came into use or were remodelled. 
They are not, according to this account, fixed functions of 
pure reason, as if we were miraculously in possession of a 
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somewhat faded transcript of God's design for creation. We 
do not have ideas because we are rational; on the contrary, 
we have reason only in so far as our ideas are kept in intel- 
ligent adjustment to the demands of action. Science is just 
the art of keeping our ideas intelligently close to actual ex- 
perience. Dewey calls this art "inquiry"; it has its special 
skills and techniques like any other high craft. 
Since cooperation and conlmunication are essential to 
human success, the evolutionary way of looking at things 
brings language into prominence. But language must serve 
two rather different purposes in a scientific age. It must 
provide both a flexible means of communication and a neces- 
sary tool of intellectual analysis. The latter aspect of lan- 
guage is that which formal logic has always singled out for 
special attention, formal logic being the study of valid argu- 
ment and correct inference in general. The mention of this 
subject brings us at once to a digerent set of nineteenth cen- 
tury ideas and a different and even more remarkable move- 
ment of twentieth century thought. 
I t  brings us, in a word, to the Principia Mathematica 
of Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead, the three volumes 
of which appeared from 1910 to 1913. Though the out- 
come of a considerable movement reaching back to the middle 
of the previous century, and inconceivable but for several 
earlier mathematical and logical achievements, this work 
at once served notice that logic had at last caught up with 
the modem age. The immediate result was a remarkable 
burst of logical investigation all over the world. The ideas 
of Principia Mathematica are much too technical for even 
cursory explanation. But let us not forget what we are 
supposed to be talking about: the inventive freedom of the 
human intellect. What this work gave to the world was a 
whole new, incomparably more versatile formal logic, a new 
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technique of analyzing our ideas or meanings, and a new , 
logical language, spare and lean, but athletic and precise, 
invented for the sole purpose of facilitating the analytic 
function of language. 
~ h e s e  developments brought recognition througl~out the 
world that logical rigor was not confined to the traditional 
syllogisn~ or to the established branches of matllematics but 
o u l d  be achieved in an indefinite number of ways. Logic 
suddenly acquired a plural, and it was fashionable for a 
time to speak of various logics. Make any assumptions and 
lay down any rules or stipulations you choose, then you will 
not go astray logically as long as you stick to the assump- 
tions witill which you start. Given this wonderful freedom 
of stipulation, the deduction of indefinitely many logically 
tight systems become a theoretical possibility. Plainly, our 
ideas are not, strictly speaking, copies of anything, either in 
experience or in the nature of our reason; they are inventions 
and free constructions. 
The two philosophic trends which we have been broadly 
tracing meet here and go on together in rather remarkable 
mutual support. For there is an aspect of free invention in 
the logical texture of our systematic knowledge. The ability 
to infer from a present situation to future possibilities de- 
pends upon an organization of experience in terms of some 
logical structure. But the choice of a particular abstract 
system to use in interpreting experience reflects the tastes 
and purposes of the investigator. He is likely to have a 
strong preference for simplicity, convenience, and symmetsy 
in his theories. These values are practical and aesthetic rather 
than cognitive. The scientific investigator desires to get 
ahead with his work and quite sensibly chooses the methods, 
including the logical methods, which seem to promise solu- 
tion of his problems with the greatest economy of effort. 
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The successful solution, of course, is not a matter of choice; 
it depends entirely upon empirical confirmation of the ab- 
stract scheme by means of which the scientist tries to de- 
scribe the facts. And there is only one way, in general, to 
obtain adequate confismation. Fisst we have to figure out 
what logically must happen if the theory holds under cer- 
tain specific conditions, and we then must provide those 
conditions and see what actually does happen. If things 
happen as expected, the theory is so far confirmed; if things 
happen in some other way, then some correction must be 
made somewllere. Sometimes the theory must be abandoned 
and another one put in its place, as when non-Euclidean 
geometry replaced Euclidean geometry in certain branches 
of physics during this century. 
The center of this proceduse is exact prediction, and that . 
is a strictly logical procedure, a deduction from assumed 
premises. Apart from logic and the rigid necessities of con- 
sistent thinking, prediction becomes sheer guesswork, and 
we cannot really judge whether experience confirms our 
theories or not. The growing mastery of analytical techniques 
(foimal logic and pure mathematics) supplies an increasing 
repertory of terms in which to undertake the description of 
nature. Analytic reasoning gives us that purchase on neces- 
sity without which we cannot accurately detect objective 
events and relations. Thus it has come to be generally recog- 
nized that a logical model is what counts, not a pictorial 
model or a mechanical one. The logical model counts pre- 
cisely because it  is logical, is an abstract system of necessary 
relationships, which enables us to determine exactly what 
else would be so if the assumptions of the given system were 
so. Whether the model correctly represents the structure 
of actual events is a question for properly contrived experi- 
ence to answer. Eut without exact terms and rigorous 
58 The Rice Institute Pamphlet 
methods of inference, experience gives us no precise instruc- 
tion. Experience does not automatically supply correct terms 
for its own interpretation. These are conceptual schemes, the 
products of free logical activity. 
Confirmation of this has been a commonplace of physicists' 
practice for years. Some specialize in abstract ideas relevant 
to physical facts and are called theoretical physicists. Others 
are experimental physicists who explore the facts with the 
help of abstract ideas. I t  may be added that for thirty-five 
or forty years Russell has maintained, in theory though not 
invariably in practice, that phiIosophy should confine itself 
to logical analysis, and thus stand to science or empirical 
knowledge in general as theoretical pllysics stands to experi- 
mental physics. A not dissimilar view has also been more 
recently advocated by the influential movement known as 
logical positivism or logical empiricism. The most extraordi- 
nary fruit of this movement during the past two decades is 
the intensive study of meanings and the problem of com- 
munication, which goes by the name of semantics. Rudolf 
Carnap's study of pure semantics, The Logical Syntax of 
Language, is the outstanding work in this field. 
The pragmatic and analytic movements developed hde- 
pendently and even antagonistically; nevertheless, they have, 
as we saw, converged to a meeting at one point at least. The 
way in which they complement each other is now generally 
understood, and the main contentions of these two ap- 
proaches to the problem of knowledge are taken for granted 
by almost everybody today, whatever other differences may 
divide them. C. I. Lewis was one of the first to appreciate 
this situation fulIy. His two books, Mind and the World- 
Order (1929) and Tlze Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation 
(1947), are, to my mind, the most informative studies that 
have been made of it. 
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Because of the broad and basic agreement that now exists 
with respect to the general nature of scientific knowledge, 
I suggest that the philosophers, particularly of the first 
quarter of this century, did their work with telling effect. 
Discussion tends more and more to confine itself to technical 
matters of interest to specialists only. Meanwhile, the swirl- 
ing center of philosophical doubt has moved onward from 
the problems of knowledge to the problems of practice. 
Let us recall Butterfield's picture of modern science. I t  
had two sides: science made a new mind and a new world 
to go with it; science also dissolved an ancient tradition. It: 
did not merely add a new factor for civilization to assimilate. 
It invaded all our thinking, elbowing the old allegiances aside 
and claiming hegemony over the whole mind. This is an 
extreme view, but, if Butterfield is right, science has dissolved 
both the Classic and the Christian heritage of the Western 
World. A science that claims the whole mind tacitly projects 
a complete philosophy, which provides the frame of refer- 
ence for the intelligent direction of life. It may be doubted 
that this philosophy has yet received an adequate presenta- 
tion, though this was preeminently the task which White- 
head set himself as a philosopher. Nobody in recent years 
has worked as heroically as he did to prepare a vision of the 
world that would allow a man to dwell in it with his entire 
self in our century, and be at home intellectually, aestheti- 
cally, and practically. His best pupils, such men as Charles 
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, have continued to work in this 
spirit. But the main body of philosophers have not dared to 
follow his majestic example. 
Instead, some have sought stability by returning to a 
venerable pre-scientific tradition, and neo-Thomism has 
played a vigorous role in the most recent history of thought. 
Others have ancho~ed tlleir thinking to the indefeasible 
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reality of the personal life of each individual and have 
brought Kierkegaard, a nineteenth century Danish religious 
philosopher, back to life in tra~lslations and scholarly studies, 
But not all who attempt this find their way to Kierkegaard's 
devout conclusions; they may move toward Heidegger's 
existentialism or toward that of Sartre. Still others, appar- 
ently the majority in this country and England in the last 
few years, attack ethical problems with the equipment and 
ideas that proved servicable in epistemology. 
The outcome remains to be seen. The task immediatly 
before us, however, seems plain. I t  is to re-think wit11 our 
twentieth-century minds t l ~ e  perennial questions of human 
existence. We must work toward the goal that Whitehead 
set himself, a new syntllesis, a total articulation of insights. 
This will enable us to be faithful and resolute in action be- 
cause we are emotionally and intellectually at peace with 
ourselves. 
Anything less than this may deliver us over to a conflict 
of mere ideologies, which are only a thin veneer on the 
struggle for power. 
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